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Abstract 
The amount of outstanding U.S. sovereign debt has become a reason for worldwide 
concern especially after S&P downgraded it on August 5, 2011. The underlying analysis con-
ducted by that rating agency followed the same methodological approach it applies to any 
other country’s sovereign debt sustainability, ignoring the special role played by U.S. official 
debt in the world economy. In fact, that debt is not in the interest of that country alone, but 
also of governments, private investors and the public in general all over. The U.S. prints the 
world’s most important reserve currency, and its debt provides a most valuable safe-haven 
asset capable of stimulating real economic activity everywhere and not only in the U.S. Con-
sequently, it is important that the U.S. issue debt not taking into account its intertemporal 
budget constraint alone, but also the needs of the world at large on the grounds of an efficient 
world allocation of resources. U.S. government debt generates positive externalities to a vast 
number of economic entities not directly engaged in its transactions, for which reason the 
usual sovereign debt intertemporal budget constraint equilibrium solution is not Pareto effi-
cient. The Pareto efficient solution should be larger and achieved through appropriate mecha-
nisms including Pigou subsidies.    
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1. Introduction 
 
Robert Triffin became famous in the 1960’s especially because of the dilemma he so 
clearly understood and explained in his book Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Con-
vertibility (1960), known from then on as Triffin’s dilemma.  
The international monetary system was at the time based on the Bretton-Woods 
agreements which put into practice an adjustable-peg exchange rate regime founded on gold 
and, equivalently, on the U.S. dollar. For foreign central banks, gold was as good as U.S. dol-
lars since the American currency was freely exchangeable for that precious metal at the offi-
cial price of USD 35 per troy ounce.  
International liquidity was one of the three major problems facing the regime. It was 
solved by means of large and continuous U.S. balance of payments deficits financed mostly 
by the accumulation of U.S. dollars on foreign central banks’ reserves. Faced with the ab-
sence of sound alternatives to the US dollar, U.S. balance of payments deficits were the only 
way to accomplish two important tasks with respect to international liquidity: a) the redistri-
bution of the existing stock of official gold throughout the regime’s participating countries; b) 
to increase world’s liquidity in order to finance growing international trade and the world’s 
GDP expansion. But, at the same time this was happening, the ability of the U.S. government 
to honor its obligations within the exchange-rate regime (full USD convertibility2 into gold at 
the official peg) was continuously eroding, threatening the credibility and sustainability of the 
Bretton-Woods regime. Therefore, the dilemma was: a) if the U.S. were to stop running defi-
cits on its balance of payments to improve its gold solvency ratio, the world’s economic 
growth fed by rising flows of international trade would come to a halt, and recession and so-
cial unrest would follow; b) but if everything continued as usual, ultimately the Bretton-
Woods system would break down by a crisis of confidence. Actually, the regime collapsed in 
August 1971 when President Nixon finally declared the U.S. dollar inconvertibility into gold.    
Notwithstanding, the U.S. dollar went on playing the role of sole international curren-
cy due to the U.S. economic, military and political pre-eminence worldwide, as well as the 
country’s political, institutional, social and financial stability topped by generalized confi-
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dence in the central bank’s commitment to price stability. In fact, from 1971 up to the present 
the world has been in a dollar standard; the role played by currencies like the British pound, 
the Swiss franc, the Japanese yen and even the euro failed to lead to a multipolar system. It is 
mostly the opportunity to invest in U.S. treasuries that encourages public and official foreign 
entities to accept U.S. dollars in payment for the goods and services they sell in world mar-
kets. Besides being issued in its own currency, the market for U.S. treasuries has no equal 
when it comes to liquidity and depth, and expectations of default are non-existent. In so be-
ing, in an environment of rising international trade, the continuation of this dollar standard 
requires high and systematic U.S. general government deficits year after year.3 Starting in the 
mid seventies, the U.S. federal government debt held by the public has followed an upward 
trend, going from about 23.9% of U.S.A.’s GDP in 1974 to a projected 74% by the end of 
2011.4 In fact, the amount of debt issued shot upwards in 2008 and following years especially 
because of the counter-cyclical fiscal policies adopted to stabilize the economy and financial 
markets,5 but also due to structural imbalances between revenues and expenditures.6 Hence, 
Triffin’s dilemma hits again: either the U.S. keeps feeding the market with more debt in spite 
of its implications for its government solvency, or the world looses an invaluable safe haven 
asset, moreover capable of stimulating world’s real GDP. 
On August 5 2011, S&P downgraded the credit rating of the U.S. government debt 
from AAA to AA+. The critical argument offered by the rating agency in support of its deci-
sion was that, contrary to countries like Germany and France where the debt to GDP ratio is 
even higher than the U.S.A.’s, it does not expect the reversal of its ascending trajectory any 
time soon. In its base scenario, the agency projects debt to increase to 85% of GDP by 2021, 
and to 101% in its worst scenario. In doing so, S&P was conveying two fundamental ideas of 
its own: a) at 74% of GDP, the U.S.A. has attained an unsustainable debt level; b) the eco-
nomic analysis concerning the sustainability of sovereign debts is no different for the U.S.A. 
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as for any other country. Therefore, ceteris paribus we should expect that following the 
downgrade of American’s government debt, its yield would raise reflecting higher credit risk. 
Yet, as a refuge asset, yields on U.S. treasuries are negatively correlated with market volatili-
ty and risk aversion for which reason their yields in fact decreased instead of going up! For 
comparative purposes, the table below shows the evolution of some ten-year maturity triple A 
sovereign debt yields as well as U.S.A.’s along the mentioned time period. 
 
Table 1. Yields of Selected Ten Year Maturity Sovereign Debts (in %) 
Country January 
5th, 2011 
July 5th, 
2011 
August 5th, 
2011 
August 
8th, 2011 
August 
16th, 2011 
%Change 
August 5th-
August 8th  
%Change 
August 5th-
August 16th  
Finland 3.17 3.31 2.94 2.64 2.68 -10.20 -8.84 
France 3.36 3.48 3.25 3.11 2.96 -4.31 -8.92 
Germany 2.97 2.98 2.35 2.27 2.28 -3.40 -2.98 
Netherlands 3.17 3.34 2.79 2.69 2.66 -3.58 -4.66 
Sweden 3.23 2.93 2.36 2.25 2.19 -4.66 -7.20 
U.K. 3.55 3.33 2.77 2.66 2.50 -3.97 -9.75 
U.S.A. 3.49 3.13 2.55 2.34 2.22 -8.24 -12.94 
 
This table displays some noteworthy information deserving to be looked at attentive-
ly. First, in the period prior to the downgrade, debt issued by Germany and Sweden benefited 
from the lowest yields in this selected AAA sample. At the beginning of the year, the spread 
of the U.S.A. debt with respect to Germany’s was 52 basis points. Secondly, in the first trad-
ing day subsequent to that event all the yields in the sample took lower values but, second 
only to Finland’s, the yield on U.S.A. debt was the one which dropped the most, exactly 21 
basis points, or 8.24% in comparison to its previous value. Thirdly, this downward movement 
continued in the trading days ahead, such that on August 16 the yield on the American sover-
eign debt was 12.9% lower, the same as 33 basis points, when compared to its value immedi-
ately before the credit rating downgrade and, with Sweden’s exception, became the lowest 
among all the countries in the sample. 
The across the board decline in those yields is correlated with the rise in equity mar-
kets’ perceived risk as evaluated by implied volatility. The CBOE volatility index, whose 
ticker is VIX, measures the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index and, as such, it is a credi-
ble barometer of investor sentiment, or risk aversion sentiment. In the period from 2004 
through 2010, the correlation coefficient between VIX and the S&P 500 index ranged from -
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0.75 in 2009 to -0.85 in 2007, -0.84 in 2008 and again in 2010.12 On selected years, VIX’s 
maximum close values are listed in table 2.13 
 
Table 2. VIX’s Peak Values in Selected Years 
Dates 23-Aug-90 30-Oct-97 8-Oct-98 20-Sep-01 5-Aug-02 16-Aug-06 12-Nov-07 20-Nov-08 8-Aug-
201116 
VIX`s 
Values 
35.47 38.20 45.74 43.74 45.08 30.83 31.09 80.85 48.00 
 
On August 5 2011, VIX quoted at 32.00, and on the 16th of the same month at 32.85, 
whereas on January 5 it stood at only 17.07. This data puts into evidence the existing negative 
relationship between bond yields and volatility in the equity market, as well as the sizeable 
reduction in investor’s confidence caused by the unexpected cut in the U.S.A. sovereign debt 
credit rating.  
The fact that faced with S&P credit rating cut the yield on American Treasury 10 year 
notes was the one to decrease the most, instead of rising, is a clear indication of the special 
role played by American debt in today’s world economy. With an estimated USD 10.856 
billion in circulation at the end of 2011,17 the market for the U.S.A. sovereign debt enjoys 
levels of liquidity and depth without parallel. It functions not exclusively to finance American 
government budget deficits, but also as an asset of refuge for governments and investors 
worldwide. About 47% of that debt is held by foreign entities; China at the top of the list, 
followed by Japan, the U.K., the oil exporting countries, Brazil, etc. In so being, when the 
U.S.A. government issues debt it is rendering very important services to others, which go 
well beyond its own specific financial and economic interests. Not only U.S.A. debt provides 
shelter to investors’ assets, as it ensures a floor for wealth preservation that generates utility 
to everybody. This last outcome comes across because wealth preservation helps to stabilize 
economic conditions, and is a powerful engine for economic recovery once countries are in 
recession or depression.  
Our argument is as follows: besides providing utility to those directly involved, and 
whose costs and benefits are internalized through the price system, American sovereign debt 
also generates positive externalities to the world’s population in general. Because it preserves 
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not only wealth with all the benefits attached, but also because when the U.S. government 
issues debt to stimulate its economy out of recession it contributes powerfully to the recovery 
of other country’s economies. This same line of argument applies to the benefits that U.S.A. 
military expenditures extend to its allies in NATO or in any other military organization. 
Then, by definition, the usual sustainability solutions for the amount of sovereign debt is not 
Pareto efficient, since it is well known that externalities produce sub-optimum allocation of 
resources. Three inter-related corollaries follow from this last statement:  
a) The world’s socially efficient solution for the amount of debt to be issued by the 
U.S. government is higher that the indicated by the debt sustainability solutions;  
b) The assessment of the American sovereign debt credit risk should not follow the 
standard procedures applied to non-world reserve currency countries;  
c) The yield on that debt should be lower than its market solution by the external mar-
ginal benefits it generates at the socially efficient solution. 
The next chapter attempts at illustrating the mechanics of the argument and of the 
corollaries stated above. 
 
2. Equilibrium Solution in the Secondary Sovereign Debt Market   
 
American sovereign debt trades in world markets. Both national and international, as 
well as official and private investors supply funds in this market, which is tantamount to de-
mand bills, notes and treasury bonds.19 On the other hand, investors demand these funds 
when they decide to supply debt securities and cash in at their market prices. At any time, we 
are dealing with stocks of debt, whose existing amount depends on government’s present and 
past budget balances. 
Then, the funds supply function in this market, measured as a proportion of GDP at 
time , is written in the equation below: 
 
 = (, 	, 
, )                                                                                                        (1) 
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The meanings of the symbols used are: , the yield on sovereign debt;, the sovereign 
debt’s risk implied in its credit rating; , the risk level of the equity market as perceived by 
investors, and measured by a fear index like CBOE’s VIX; , the country’s currency quality 
as an international refuge quantified by means of an index. By its own nature, R is basically a 
parameter in the short-run though subject to gradual changes in the medium and long-runs. 
With respect to  we write it as an increasing function of the actual stock of debt as a 
proportion of GDP, and of its expected growth rate in the medium-run. Accordingly, we 
have: 
 
 = (, ())                                                                               (2) 
 
 stands for the actual stock of debt at time  as a proportion of , and 
() as its expected value in the future, based on the best vector of information availa-
ble at time . 
 
Figure 1. Funds Supply Curve in the Secondary Sovereign Debt Market 
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Supply curves -. and -1 relate to two different countries, and assume equal values for 
 and . The difference between the supply conditions faced by these countries is that the 
market expects a higher future upward debt trajectory for country 2 than for country 1. Ac-
cordingly, depending on how these expectations change, supply curves will move up or 
down. At sufficiently low levels of indebtedness, for example, for all values of -(%) ≤
4, credit risk does not exist and the risk free interest rate , is charged. Therefore, we redefine 
risk free interest rate in this manner: the interest rate investors are willing to charge when the 
actual sovereign indebtedness as a proportion of GDP is so low that they do not sense any 
credit risk whatsoever. This definition is slightly different from the conventional one since I 
impose a loose condition for the absence of credit risk.  
For any values of (), increased volatility in the equity market pushes down 
the supply curve, and this movement is so much stronger the more debt is issued by a world-
wide reserve currency country. Investors treat bonds and stocks as substitutes. Let’s focus on 
country 1 again; if volatility increases in the equity market, such that . > ) , the supply 
curve goes down. If, in addition, country 1 prints international money and, as a consequence, 
.))) > ), the downward movement is more pronounced and goes as far as curve    
As a proportion of GDP, we assume that the demand for funds in the secondary sov-
ereign debt market is a negative function of the: a) yield; b) volatility in the stock market; c) 
index of world reserve currency; d) government’s budget balance. And a positive function of 
the government’s debt risk. In effect, the stock of debt outstanding is a consequence of past 
and present budget imbalances, such that deficits raise the amount of public debt, whereas 
surpluses reduce it. All variables are referred to time . Formally, all this is stated in the equa-
tion that follows next. 
 
5 = 6(, 	, 
, , 788)                                                                                               
(3) 
 
D is the demand function, 99 is the period’s government budget balance, and we 
expect: 

< 0; 

> 0; 
#
< 0; 
$
< 0; 
 ::
< 0. 
In a two dimensional space, with the yield being measured on the vertical axis, the 
demand curve is downward sloping. Moreover, it will move to the right or to the left depend-
-0.[()., ., ).]. 
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ing on changes in the values of the other explanatory variables at time  according to the 
signs of the first order partial derivatives above. 
Figure 2 below shows the sovereign debt market’s equilibrium solution for two coun-
tries, for example, Germany and the U.S.A.. For illustrative purposes, I take the debt values 
estimated on August 5th, 2011 for year’s end, as well as S&P critical assumption that while 
Germany had embarked on a downward trajectory for its debt to GDP ratio, exactly the oppo-
site was true for the U.S.A.. The initial market equilibrium solution is determined by demand 
and supply conditions denoted with subscripts 1 for each one of both countries. The inter-
play between supply and demand shows that, ceteris paribus, increases in expected future 
trajectories of debt leads to higher yields through upward movements on both curves. 
 
Figure 2. Equilibrium Solution in the Secondary Sovereign Debt Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
As mentioned in section 1, the unexpected decision taken by S&P, coupled with addi-
tional distressing economic information, resulted in a 50% rise in the VIX index, from Friday 
5th to the next trading day, Monday 8th 2011. World investors ran away from stocks and took 
refuge in bonds. Both supply and demand curves for funds in the secondary market for bonds 
moved downwards, with special emphasis for U.S. sovereign debt due to its particular stand-
ing as the world’s most important safe-haven asset. Differently from what one would expect 
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from commonly used valuation models, the yield on American debt fell substantially, not just 
in absolute but also in relative terms, instead of rising, largely as an outcome of the U.S. 
treasury’s ability to play that role. In fact, following S&P downgrade, those yields reached 
historically low levels. That is, the impact explained by its role as a refuge asset more than 
compensated the one arising from its amplified credit risk. Demand and supply conditions 
denoted with subscripts 2 for each of the two countries determine market equilibrium solu-
tions following S&P downgrade.  
The compensated effect just referred to means, in fact, that market participants didn’t 
value S&P’s decision to downgrade in any significant way. Bohn’s paper (2011) sheds some 
light on why that was the case. In spite of negative USA’s primary budget balances for the 
periods 1792-2010 (0.3% of GDP) and for 1915-2010 (1.2% of GDP) (Bohn, 2011, p.5), in 
average, there was never a case of U.S. government insolvency. Besides having benefited 
from average interest rates charged on public debt significantly below the U.S’s average real 
growth rate (4.7% compared to 6.7% for the period 1915-2010, (Bohn, p.4)), from a long-
term fiscal reaction function that fulfilled the necessary and sufficient conditions for sustain-
ability,21 on top of that the intertemporal budget constraint has been wholly satisfied by the 
covariance with the systematic risks reflected in the stochastic discount rate of expected fu-
ture budget cash-flows (Bohn, 2011, pp.5-6).  
 
3. The World’s Socially Efficient Amount of U.S. Sovereign Debt  
 
S&P alleged that the amount of U.S. debt already issued, coupled with its anticipated 
trajectory, was unsustainable and, therefore, undesirable. By doing so, the rating agency 
caused deep and widespread commotion. The ensuing impact in the stock markets, on inves-
tor’s and general public`s expectations concerning the future performance of the American 
economy and on people’s psychology were enormous and depressing. I argue that even 
though S&P’s analysis might be correct under an exclusively national perspective, it is 
flawed in one important theoretical respect, potentially leading to erroneous evaluations and 
needlessly global detrimental consequences. 
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Our argument states that the amount of sustainable U.S. government debt should not 
be measured in the same manner as any other country’s debt. Specifically, we argue that it 
generates positive externalities that benefit people and organizations not directly involved in 
its transactions. And, as it is well known, solutions that do not incorporate externalities are 
socially inefficient. These externalities arise at least from two sources, which are:  
a) Given its role as a refuge asset, that specific debt provides a floor to investor’s 
wealth and, in so doing, it acts as an automatic stabilizer to the world economy; indeed, it is 
well known from economic theory the influence played by wealth on important macro-
economic variables;  
b) When the U.S.A. stimulates its own economy out of recession by means of expan-
sionary fiscal policies financed by new debt, it is doing the same to all countries; this same 
type of argument goes with U.S. defense expenditures concerning the effective protection it 
effectively accords to its allies both in times of peace and war.  
In view of what the theory on efficient allocation of resources establishes, the external 
marginal benefits to the world economy generated by the issuance of U.S. sovereign debt 
must be taken into account, in addition to the private marginal benefits already incorporated 
in the demand curve for the “consumption” of debt. Taking advantage of the negative rela-
tionship between yield and treasury’s market prices, the figure below illustrates the argument 
in the manner typical to the theory of externalities under partial equilibrium analysis. Implic-
itly we add demand curve ∗ which identifies the marginal benefits collected by those who 
do not demand treasuries in the market, but nevertheless benefit from other’s demand as rep-
resented by DE/FGHEF, because of the beneficial and unintended spillovers not internalized 
by the price system. The measure of the social marginal benefits generated by the activity is 
given by the vertical summation of curves DE/FGHEF and ∗23, as identified by curve ′. 
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 The demand curve ∗is not shown in the figure to not overcharge it. 
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Figure 3. Positive Externalities in the Sovereign Debt Market and the Efficient Amount of Debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The equilibrium solution given by the intersection point I is the one determined by 
market demand and supply, abstracting from the externalities generated by this kind of sover-
eign debt. We assume it corresponds to the debt sustainable solution. The coordinates of point 
J give the socially efficient solution for debt when positive externalities are taken into ac-
count and, accordingly:  
a) The amount of debt issued by the world currency country should expand from A to 
B; the stock of sovereign debt given by A might be associated with its sustainable value in 
the absence of positive externalities; 
b) For that to happen it is necessary that debt is issued at a lower price, K, which cor-
responds to a higher yield, in order for that larger amount be absorbed by demand;  
c) The issuing country would require a lower interest rate, higher price, 0, in order to 
go along with this normative expansionary result, that is, to ensure its own solvency in face of 
debt expansion beyond the usual sustainability conditions;  
d) All this is tantamount to grant to the issuer reserve currency country a subsidy 
equal to the segment JL per unit of debt; 
e) The amount of that subsidy is equal to the marginal external benefits at the world’s 
socially efficient quantity of debt, B. 
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The lower offer yield charged on that government’s debt is an essential feature of this 
mechanism because in spite of the higher debt responsibilities, the economically justifiable 
reduction on interest will keep it on a sustainable path. 
The equation for the level of sustainable debt, as a proportion of GDP, is as follows 
below, Equation (4). 
 
 

N
=
OPQ
R
[ST ]
                                                                                                                     (4)       
 
where ( − ) is the primary budget balance, V is the GDP level,  the real interest rate 
charged on public debt, and T  is GDP’s real rate of growth. The subsidy on the interest rate, 
denoted by W, would raise the ratio by lowering the denominator, by F
[ST ]SF
 % > 0, since 
[ − T ] > W. 
But, of course, the main question now is who is going to pay for these optimum debt 
inducing subsidies. Since the critical assumption here is that this particular debt produces 
utility outside the political borders of the issuing country, foreign beneficiaries are the ones 
who should be held accountable for paying that subsidy to the U.S. government. On practical 
grounds this could be done by empowering an international organization like the IMF, whose 
participating countries were supposed to contribute according to the external benefits they 
enjoy from U.S. debt stimulus to their economies. In turn, the revenue necessary to cover 
these payments should be raised by taxes on non-American residents. In fact, this mechanism 
could take advantage in its implementation of the IMF long-held experience with credit fa-
cilities. As acknowledged before, the U.S. government is a creditor in this scheme.  
This is a market type mechanism to induce the efficient allocation of resources in the 
presence of externalities following the tradition of Coase because it would come about 
through negotiations among the countries involved. In fact, considering the reduced probabil-
ity attached to the development of a consistent and credible multipolar system of world safe 
reserve assets,25 the mechanism we propose is a substitute, and potentially a more stable one, 
resting on international co-operative agreements that anchor the fiscal capacity of the U.S. 
government. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
The present day international monetary system, not the international exchange-rate 
regime, is a USD standard. However, it is a de facto system, not a de jure system based on 
international agreements and supported by governing institutions and rules forcing consistent 
behavioral patterns by the member states. In an increasingly interpendent world economy, 
based on free trade and capital flows, it is undeniable the need for an efficiently functioning 
international currency. By means of the reasons already mentioned in this paper, the USD 
acquired the role of the sole international currency, but it remains to be addressed the ques-
tion concerning its efficient provision of that most important function. Moreover, at this time, 
no other national currency we know of aspires to compete with the USD in this position; 
quite on the contrary, the present day difficulties and loss of credibility of the euro has only 
reinforced the unlikelihood of a multipolar reserve system. Among a variety of other reasons, 
it is quite understandable that other countries with such a potential, like Japan and China, 
oppose playing such a role, bearing in mind the economic losses they would experience de-
rived by the appreciation of their currencies. That is why the Central Bank of Japan has 
strongly intervened in the currency market these last weeks.  
The informal USD standard from which we benefit today succeeded to minimize the 
negotiation costs, but suffers from considerable flaws that generate worldwide instability 
harmful to sustained growth and prosperity. The need for its improvement is visible, the more 
so under the present economic circumstances. The proposal I present here has as its starting 
point an obvious market distortion that has not been attended to so far. The question of effi-
ciency demands an organic building of the international USD monetary standard.   
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